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Twenty years after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism
the battles about the right interpretation of the twentieth century past are still
being fought. In some countries even the courts have their say on what is or is
not the historical truth. But primarily politicians have claimed a dominant role
in these debates, often mixing history and politics in an irresponsible way.
The European Parliament has become the arena where this culminates.
Nevertheless, not every Member of Parliament wants to play historian. That is the
background of Politics of the Past, in which historians take the floor to discuss
the tense and ambivalent relationship between their profession and politics.
Pierre Hassner: “Judges are no better placed than governments to replace open
dialogue between historians, between historians and public opinion, between
citizens and within and between democratic societies. That is why this book is
such an important initiative.”
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Bronisław Geremek, historian, former political dissident and
our dear colleague, was one of the speakers at the event
which we organized in Prague to commemorate the Spring of
1968. As always, his contribution to the debate was balanced
and full of insights. His life was devoted to just causes whether
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History and Politics: 
Recommendations from 
a New Comparative Agenda
As the saying goes, under communism only the future was certain,
while the past was constantly being rewritten. Today the future of
communism is indeed a certainty but the past two decades have
demonstrated that the rewriting of history per se is not only a com-
munist peculiarity. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the
Soviet Union have certainly given a new sense of urgency and
 direction to academic debates on fascism and communism as
 historical phenomena and to comparisons of the two. As historical
issues they have also returned to haunt current European
 politicians.
Historians and political agendas
It is not only the views of historians that change over time; the
understanding that academics have of their own role in national
politics and society changes too. In the 19th century, historians had
a role to play in nation-building: first inventing a synthesis of na-
tional history, next imbuing the populace with a sense of a shared
national past and a common future, and finally – once the nation
state had been created – identifying (ethnic) minorities in society to
be excluded from that nation. In that era, historians rarely ques-
tioned their responsibility for representing the nation as a good
cause in history. As the nation – their own – was considered the be
all and end all of the historical process, taking sides was not
 considered problematic for academic objectivity. 
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Communist historians would later use the term partijnost to de-
scribe this partisan form of objectivity. If the class struggle of the
proletariat constituted the prime mover of history, historical truth
could only be found in a class perspective. Arguably, the European
Union’s 50th anniversary celebrations show that it too has made
the most of history as a medium of identification, highlighting a
shared European past and cultural legacy rather than a history of
conflicts and national introspection.
National history – or, for that matter, European history – is inherently
selective and one-sided. As Ernest Renan noted, history is not so
much about collective memory but first of all about forgetting. He
defined the nation as: “… a group of people united by a common
hatred of their neighbours and a shared misunderstanding of their
past.”
After the traumatic experience of the Second World War and in the
context of the ideological bipolarity of the Cold War, the role of his-
torians changed significantly. In Western Europe the task of histo-
rians shifted from generating popular identification with a national
history, its myths, and its heroes to the past and present unity and
continuity of the democratic West or the Atlanticist Europe – par-
tijnost in favour of the Western system of market economy and plu-
ralist democracy. 
With the end of the Cold War and the ideological stand-off
 between West and East, a new momentous task befell historians.
In the EU of the 1990s, candidate countries of Central Europe
 reinventing national history and redefining national identity after half
a century of foreign occupation and domination became the prior-
ity of historiography. Meanwhile, West European historians began
to reconsider the East-West division of the continent, thus con-
tributing to the political project of reunifying Europe and preparing
the ground for EU enlargement.
We may detest some political agendas and applaud others but, as
a matter of principle, reducing history to politically adequate state-
ments always flies in the face of history as an academic endeavour.
After all, the art of politics is finding compromises; the essence of
scholarship is contrasting diverging positions. As Karl Popper
demonstrated, progress in academia is not found in compromise
but in polarisation.
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The tension between academic history and politics, therefore, is in-
evitable and essentially irresolvable. Thus any discussion of the role
of historians, academic research and history textbooks in relation to
politics should proceed with caution, especially when addressing
the ideal of objectivity. History itself is objective in the sense that it
exists, or existed, even if unknown to us. Yet no objective historical
narrative exists – objective’ in the sense that the narrative corre-
sponds fully and verifiably to a historical reality. 
The problem is not merely one of inadequate sources and the im-
perfect writing of history. Any historian is responsive to societal de-
mands and may even be part of a political agenda. Some may
intentionally champion a particular political cause in their work.
 Others may become aware only in retrospect of their indebtedness
to a certain Zeitgeist. Historians are bound to be influenced by the
politicisation of their topic, even when they set out to expose
 political interpretations or demystify conventional wisdom. 
Highlighting the role of social democracy in resisting totalitarian
ideologies is also part of a political agenda. So is disassembling
national myths. There may be an apparent difference between, on
the one hand, an ideological pamphlet championing a one-sided
truth while condemning all alternative views and, on the other hand,
a serious academic study proposing a new interpretation of history
after critical evaluation of the historiographical state of the art. The
line drawn between academic originality and outright misinterpre-
tation can only be based on a robust degree of consensus within
the community of professional historians. This line is bound to shift
over time and does not represent objective history or truth. Debates
on the use and abuse of history in politics and the separation of
objectionable partisan views from historical interpretations that are
expected to promote values of democracy, individual freedom, and
national identification are inherently political. Accusations of abus-
ing history or falsification are a curse for academic historians, not
only because they suggest the existence of objective truth, but also
because they may turn against them and against any iconoclastic
or unwelcome re-interpretations. The history of the comparative his-
tory of fascism and communism bears out this conclusion. In the
paradigm shifts of the past half-century in the academic study of
 totalitarian regimes, political agendas were never far away. 
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Comparing fascist and communist regimes
The role of history writing after the traumas and atrocities of the
Third Reich, the Second World War and the Holocaust was no
longer to create a collective memory of a national past, but to fa-
cilitate national amnesia. West European historians in the 1950s
excluded Hitler, Mussolini and their fascist cliques from humanity;
their accomplices in other countries were portrayed as unrepre-
sentative of their respective nations. The evil genius of the Third
Reich had overpowered the nations of Europe, including the
 German nation. Such a totalitarian view basically exonerated the
broader populace, presenting them as victims. Not least because
of the ideological confrontation with communism, national history in
France or the Netherlands was redefined as an antedated quest
for a democratic state rather than a nation state. Collaborators and
fascists were depicted as a small minority that had betrayed the
nation – both as an ethnic community and as a democratic com-
munity. Thus, in the 1950s, the term totalitarian exonerated one’s
own nation from complicity in fascism. 
This poorly defined concept contributed little to the study of fascism
as a historical phenomenon in Europe. Politically, however, it greatly
contributed to the consolidation of the East-West divide by equat-
ing communism/Stalinism with fascism/national socialism and to
the demonization of the Soviet regime and its followers in the East-
ern Bloc. Totalitarianism was not an academic theory at all, since it
did not allow for alternative explanations or empirical testing. Nor
was it comparative as it presupposed the equation of fascism and
communism in their dictatorial essence. The core assumption of to-
talitarianism – total control of the fascist or communist dictatorship
over the population – made historical research all but redundant.
One evil leader executed a pre-ordained master plan and managed
to wreck the course of history almost single-handedly. Why then
study a society that experienced total repression, except to testify
to its suffering? Why study an allegedly monolithic regime with a
premeditated strategy, except to demonstrate the ruthless imple-
mentation of this evil plan? Various aspects of totalitarianism as
historical interpretation fitted in nicely with the war-time experiences
and post-war requirements of West European societies. The per-
ception that fascism had been too overpowering to resist implied
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both a collective and individual exoneration from fascism and a
clear-cut opposition to Soviet communism. Reconstruction got
 priority over remembering.
The 1960s were characterised by a reaction to the totalitarianism
theory of the 1950s. Revisionists presented an alternative view of
communist and fascist regimes on the basis of archival research
both in the Soviet Union and in Germany. They rooted the emer-
gence of both regimes in the characteristics, dilemmas and deficits
of German and Russian society. Fascism and communism were no
longer seen as just the grand strategies of dictatorial cliques, but,
in the revisionists’ understanding, involved larger parts of society.
The revisionists championed academic objectivity, but by con-
demning the anti-communist and exonerating the instrumentalisa-
tion of history by totalitarianists, they too became highly political:
opposition to a politicised view of history is by default a political
statement. Typically, revisionists were preoccupied with the in-
depth study of both regimes and a principled rejection of the total-
itarian definition of Stalinism and Nazism: as much as the
Sonderweg thesis of Germany’s road to Nazism irritated totalitari-
anists, the latter aggravated revisionists. The Historikerstreit of the
1980s marked the apex of the confrontation between totalitarian-
ists and revisionists, with the totalitarianists determined to salvage
German history and the West from the odium of the Third Reich by
emphasising its singularity.   
Diverging experiences of the short twentieth century as an age of
extremes explain the persistence of the East-West divide. In West-
ern Europe, communism dropped off the political agenda with the
end of the Cold War and the debate on fascism correspondingly
lost much of its political edge. Those who witnessed the atrocities
of fascism and lived to tell have been succeeded by new genera-
tions. These people were educated to remember the horrors of the
Second World War and the Holocaust, but without the personal
experience of those before them. Professional historians are tak-
ing over from eyewitnesses. Typically, young academic historians
in Eastern Europe today are more interested in the fascist move-
ments and regimes of their countries than in fifty years of commu-
nist rule. The dismantling of communist ideology and its elimination
from national histories has topped the political agenda over the past
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two decades. Ironically, while the political and academic establish-
ments are preoccupied with settling a score with communism,
 fascism became a non-political field of study by default.
Currently academic historians enjoy a fascinating window of op-
portunity (even obligation) to revisit the fascism-communism com-
parison. The constraints of Cold War bipolarity have disappeared
and both systems have become historical phenomena. The gener-
ation of eyewitnesses and victims has left behind an abundance of
research material that is now readily available. Academic research,
especially in the new member states of the EU, is exploring new
directions and approaches. The functioning of fascist and commu-
nist regimes at the micro-level had not been studied before. Due to
the politicisation of these issues and the taboos involved, the ac-
tual archival sources available had largely remained unexplored by
historians in communist times. Research has produced new inter-
esting insights. Firstly, it has seriously qualified the traditional pre-
war contrast between democracies in Western Europe and an
authoritarian relapse in most of Eastern Europe and, similarly, the
presumed strict divide between the democratic majority in each
West European polity and the marginal left and right wing extrem-
ists. It appears that many liberal and social democratic politicians
were attracted to political ideas that we would now hesitate to label
as democratic: corporatist parliaments, banning of political parties
or arbitrary limitations on the freedom of the press. The struggle of
East European politicians to internalise the idea of mass democracy
and the consequences of universal suffrage seems more familiar.
The democratic track record of most East European countries
began with the introduction of universal suffrage in 1918 and ended
with some form of royal or military dictatorship in the 1930s. The
factors involved and the dynamics of these processes of democ-
ratisation and its reversal were too heterogeneous to warrant any
simple conclusions contrasting East and West. Secondly, the to-
talitarian comparison of Stalin and Hitler is back. It is, however, an-
alytical rather than holistic, and it addresses issues that would have
been unthinkable in the totalitarianist paradigm, such as disunity
within the regimes, popular resistance, those parts of society be-
yond the control of the regime, and the regime’s choice between
state violence and other means of managing society. Such
 analytical comparisons reinvigorate historical research, bypass
moral issues and may defy current political agendas.   
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Europe’s responsibilities
It is certainly no coincidence that academic historians were over-
represented among the first generation of post-communist political
leaders in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, writers of history are not
qualified to provide definitive answers to what are essentially
 political questions. They may, however, be helpful in rephrasing and
reframing some of the dilemmas. The key insight should be that any
appeal for the de-politicisation of or removal of myths from history
is in itself an essentially political statement. The history of the fas-
cism-communism comparison has demonstrated that history as an
academic discipline cannot escape political context and
 controversy.
The challenge that the new member states of the European Union
face is the Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen – processes that
should have been sequential, happening simultaneously. European
integration is supposed to remove the borders separating Euro-
pean nations and to reduce the importance of national identity. At
the same time, the memory of what is perceived as fifty years of
foreign occupation and communist ideology made the reconfirma-
tion of national identity a top priority in Romania, Slovakia or Esto-
nia. For the countries of Western Europe that faced only one actual
aggressor in the Second World War, no moral dilemma between
democracy and the nation arose; or at least the dilemma could be
contained by downplaying the role of communist resistance during
the Second World War. However, in societies that lived through
both fascist and communist occupation and dictatorship, the moral
dilemma is more strenuous. In the military and geopolitical realities
of the late 1930s and the war years, a righteous third option rarely
existed for those who fought for the nation and national statehood.
That circumstance made them take sides – be it with the Russian
communists or with the German fascists. 
In retrospect, with the nation state as an historical norm, former
 opponents may equally claim to have fulfilled their patriotic duty.
From that perspective we can understand how the question as to
whether communists should be allowed to celebrate the October
Revolution near the monument of the Red Riflemen in Riga leads to
controversy. Obviously, the new directions in comparative research
on fascism and communism will be hard to sell to a broader  public.
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Academics are not (and should not be) interested in passing moral
and/or political judgements. Moral judgements are irrelevant for a
better understanding of the how and why of inhuman, dictatorial
regimes – as Eric Hobsbawm once noted: “Would Nazism have
been half as evil, if it had killed three, not six million Jews?” The on-
going debate in Russia on whether Stalin’s regime caused two or
twenty million deaths is irrelevant for our historical understanding
and the Vergangenheitsbewältigung, coping with the past in the
broadest sense. Typically, the results of academic research and the
new fascism-communism comparison take a decade or two to
trickle down to school textbooks. The key question today, however,
is how to handle these issues on the political level, both in the pub-
lic debate in the relevant countries and in situations of international
contestation.
Consequently, a number of recommendations can be made on how
politics could deal with historical questions. In the first place, it is
essential to distinguish between nations on the one hand and
democracy on the other, both as objective and as norm. By imply-
ing that what is good for the nation must also be good for democ-
racy or that the nation takes precedence over democratic values,
moral contradictions arise, for instance the apparent need to justify
Nazi collaboration for the sake of the nation. Secondly, it is neces-
sary to promote understanding for the peculiarity of the double
 dictatorial legacy in the new member states in the public debate in
Western Europe and to counter Western prejudices of alleged fas-
cist sympathies and irrational anti-Russian sentiments in Eastern
Europe. Thirdly, we need to avoid confusing the nostalgia of the
last generation of war veterans and ideological outbursts of neo-
fascism and national Bolshevism among the younger generations.
Finally, middle ground has to be found between the implicit con-
demnation of an entire nation on the basis of the past strength of
and support for totalitarian movements in a country on the one
hand, and national amnesia claiming that fascist and communist
leanings had always been alien to the democratic national  character
on the other.
Totalitarianist views are not helpful to this political agenda as they
imply a moral either/or. The revisionism of the 1960s and the  in-
depth study of interaction between society at large and dictatorial
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regimes provides a deeper understanding of the grey zones in
 historical reality and the extent to which totalitarian regimes per-
vaded everyday life. Last but not least, the more recent analytical
comparative approach strongly suggests that, despite the funda-
mental differences between the regimes and ideologies of Hitler
and Stalin, under both the dilemmas of collaboration, aloofness,
and choice between nation and democracy had much in common
for ordinary citizens.  
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